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I. INTRODUCTION 
 It wasn’t until the Presidential Election of 2000, and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,1 that the United States’ voting 
process was subjected to serious public scrutiny. Despite the 
improvements that have been made since then, it has become 
apparent that there is no quick fix to the persistent problems with our 
electoral infrastructure. Election administration reform is, instead, a 
continuing process. As Professor Dan Tokaji has written, it requires 
that we “accept the fact that some mistakes will be made along the 
way, and committing ourselves to righting those mistakes when they 
occur.”2  
 In 2002, the Help America Vote Act3 (HAVA) was enacted into 
law, leading to systemic improvements in voting technology. The time 
is again ripe for a serious national effort to upgrade voting 
technologies. The President’s Commission on Election Administration 
(EAC) referred to the aging of the HAVA voting systems as an 
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1 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
2 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1807 (2004). 
3 52 U.S.C.A. § 10101, Pub. L. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 
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“impending crisis.”4 Though, like any crisis, it presents the country 
with an opportunity to take action.  
 One avenue worthy of further exploration is Internet voting, or I-
voting. While the United States is not ready for Internet voting—and I-
voting in its current state is not yet ready for widespread 
implementation in the U.S.—the idea should not be ruled out at a later 
date. Professor Candice Hoke characterizes certain aspects of I-voting 
as “[e]merging [t]hreats.”5 This note contends that I-voting should be 
viewed as an opportunity rather than a threat. Taking advantage of 
this opportunity will require the United States to provide funding and 
thereby encourage innovation, while taking steps to safeguard the 
integrity and security of elections. 
 The difficult question is not whether we should explore I-voting, 
but rather how the U.S. can pursue innovation without sacrificing 
security. At present, the lack of funding for technological 
experimentation has resulted in stagnation. For the most part, 
jurisdictions are standing pat with aging technology, even as the 
threat of obsolescence looms larger with each election cycle. 
 This note argues that Congress should provide additional funding 
for technological experimentation. More specifically, Congress should 
appropriate additional funds to the EAC and related boards created by 
HAVA, allowing them to work with localities in conducting small-scale 
experiments with I-voting technology. Such experimentation 
incentivizes election administrators and those who manufacture 
voting technology to resolve concerns and build better, more secure 
products. While flaws would inevitably emerge, there is reason to 
believe that such funding and experimentation would ultimately 
provide additional opportunities for Americans to cast their ballots.  
 The United States’ experience with HAVA shows that allocating 
funds can promote innovation, but when the federal funds ran out, 
this flurry of activity came to a grinding halt. Thus, providing 
additional appropriations to the EAC is the best solution to the 
current stagnation. Funding for a competitive bidding process similar 
to that witnessed after HAVA’s enactment could entice innovation and 
the development of new technology. Not only would companies be 
 
 
 
 
4 The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission of Election Administration, THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION 
ADMINISTRATION, 62 (Jan. 2014), available at 
https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-
508.pdf [hereinafter 2014 EAC Report]. 
5 Candice Hoke, Judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting 
Technology, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1019 (2012).  
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vying to be the great implementer, thereby reducing bid prices and 
eventually reducing costs, but localities would jockey to be among the 
select few to receive these EAC funds. 
 Although the EAC has experienced significant problems in its 
relatively brief history, its bipartisan structure and associated advisory 
bodies would enable it to administer and oversee such experiments 
effectively.6 Some of these problems include: (1) the late appointment 
of the bipartisan commissioners tasked with the administration of the 
EAC; (2) insufficient funding; (3) a lack of regulatory authority to 
promulgate reforms; (4) a national partisan stalemate resulting in 
inaction; (5) a failure to release information, including a report 
finding little evidence of in-person voter fraud; and (6) agency 
capture, considering the EAC’s structure of two boards consisting 
primarily of election officials and their disproportionate interests.7 
Given these problems, it is hard to see just how the EAC could provide 
a solution. However, with funding and the proper empowerment to 
take regulatory action, the EAC will be far better poised than any other 
entity to yield results in election reform. 
 Part II of this note surveys the evolution of voting technology after 
Bush v. Gore and examines the voting laws in place then and now, 
explaining how the U.S. has arrived at its current position in regards 
to voting technology. Tracking the history of voting innovation in the 
United States reveals that changes have frequently been made 
remedially rather than proactively.  
 Part III explores the legal framework that now governs voting 
technology in the United States.  
 Part IV discusses previous experiments with I-voting both in the 
U.S. and abroad. While previous experiments show that I-voting is not 
yet ready for large-scale implementation in the U.S.,8 they do not 
support the reflexive conclusion that the problems are unsolvable.  
 Part V discusses the pitfalls and benefits that come with internet 
voting. Security is the leading concern, but it must be balanced against 
the potential benefits I-voting may yield, including, increased voter 
turnout. As an illustration, consider the sheer number of smartphones 
in our pockets. The potential for increasing turnout, especially among 
6 For an analysis of the difficulties faced by the EAC, see Dan Tokaji, The Future of Election 
Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 125, 125 (2009). 
7 Id. at 134-36.  
8 David Talbot, Why You Can’t Vote Online, MIT TECH. REVIEW (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/506741/why-you-cant-vote-online/ (describing 
an experiment in Washington, D.C., in which hackers successfully compromised a trial). 
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youth voters, is huge. For example, youth turnout (those eighteen to 
twenty-eight) in 2008, the peak for youth turnout in recent history, 
was just 48.5%,9 if I-voting were possible, the potential growth of the 
voter base could be massive. Finally, Part VI provides suggestions for 
a way forward from the current state. Innovation will not happen 
overnight but with continuing funding and experimentation, I-voting 
may provide an opportunity going forward.  
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY 
 The United States uses a hybrid system to conduct its elections. 
The electoral process involves both the public and private sectors: a 
publicly-funded system dependent on the private provision of 
governmental services.10 This system is unique because of its 
decentralization. Each of the 7,000 to 10,000 jurisdictions in this 
country, depending on how one counts city and town administration 
common in the Midwest and Northeast,11 depends upon private 
vendors as suppliers of voting technology.12 This section discusses the 
technologies these jurisdictions have utilized and then provides brief 
descriptions of current and recently used voting technology.  
A. Historical Changes in Voting Technology 
 With the turn of the 20th century, three developments emerged 
with implications for contemporary debates over voting technology: 
(1) mechanization began to be applied to voting; (2) professional 
specialization began to emerge and eventually pervade into election 
9 Dan Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y REV. 71, 88–89 (2014); Michael McDonald, 2012 Turnout: Race, Ethnicity, and 
the Youth Vote, HUFFPOST POLLSTER (May 8, 2013, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/2012-turnout-race-
ethnict_b_3240179.html. 
10 See e.g., STEPHEN H. LINDER & PAULINE VAILLANCOURT ROSENAU, Mapping the Terrain 
of the Public-Private Policy Partnership, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS, 1 
(Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000); Jennifer Nou, Privatizing Democracy: 
Promoting Election Integrity Through Procurement Contracts, 118 YALE L.J. 744 (2009).  
11 Election Administration and Voting Survey FAQ, UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE 
COMMISSION, 
http://www.eac.gov/research/election_administration_and_voting_survey_faqs.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).  
12 Nou, supra note 10, at 749. 
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administration; and (3) reforms of the electoral process were adopted 
in response to corruption.13 This section provides a brief history of 
voting technology in use during the 2000 election and underscores the 
reasons for the needed changes as a result.  
 The development of the computer and central processors with 
readers for punch-card ballots became available by the mid-1970’s,14 
and counties began adopting computer-readable ballots.15 By the 
2000 election, just under 35% of the electorate relied on the punch-
card ballot.16 Among the states relying on punch cards was Florida, the 
state that tipped the election in George W. Bush's favor.17 In Bush v. 
Gore, which effectively resolved the election, the Supreme Court noted 
the problems with punch card systems in concluding that Florida’s 
recount process violated the Equal Protection Clause. Subsequent 
research showed that approximately 2% of ballots cast in 2000 did not 
register a valid vote for President.18  
 Due to the election's outcome, studies were conducted to evaluate 
the country’s voting technology. Professor Paul Schwartz found that 
voting systems that provided “feedback” to voters regarding overvotes 
(casting more than the allowed number of choices for an officer/issue) 
and undervotes (casting fewer than the allowed number of choices for 
an office/issue) resulted in fewer errors than the central-count punch 
card and optical-scans of use during the 2000 election.19 Lawsuits 
were filed seeking to end the use of punch-card machines.  
 Against this backdrop, Congress began to consider legislation to 
overhaul the election system. It did so with the Help America Vote 
Act, the details of which are discussed in greater detail in Part III.  
13 ROY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF 
INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 105 (2006). 
14 Id. at 159. 
15 Id. at 160. 
16 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1719-20. 
17 Id. at 1724-25. 
18 Bush, 531 U.S. at 103. 
19 Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 633 
(2002). 
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B. Currently Available Technology 
 Today, there are five available means of voting technology. 
Though, some are practically obsolete. Chronologically, these are: (1) 
hand-counted paper ballots, (2) mechanical lever machines, (3) 
punch-card ballots, (4) optical-scan or “Marksense” ballots, and (5) 
electronic voting.20 The first three are seldom used, and almost all U.S. 
jurisdictions today rely on either optical-scan ballot or direct record 
electronic systems. 
1. Hand-Counted Paper Ballots 
 With paper ballots, voters make a mark beside the names of their 
selected candidates on a piece of paper, which is later counted by 
hand.21 One difficulty with this system is that errors commonly occur 
because ballots are frequently not clearly marked or ballots are easily 
misinterpreted by those charged with deciphering and counting.22 
2. Mechanical Lever Machines 
 First invented in 1892, mechanical lever machines were originally 
created to address the potentiality of tampering with paper ballots, as 
there is no document with which to tamper.23 In order for a voter to 
cast a ballot, the voter turns levers next to the desired choice, after 
which, the voter may visually confirm those choices before pulling a 
large lever, which subsequently counts the votes.24 Problems may arise 
if the machines are not configured properly or if the counters fail to 
20 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1717-18. 
21 Id. at 1718-19.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1719. 
24 Id. 
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register the selected choices.25 By 2010, use of lever machines was 
virtually extinct.26 
3. Punch-Card Ballots 
 Punch-card technology first appeared in 1964, and it was the most 
common type of voting technology in place at the time of the 2000 
Presidential election.27 To vote, a user places the punch card in a 
punching device which will line up the card with the names of 
candidates and ballot measures.28 Using a stylus, the user punches 
through the perforations to indicate the desired choice.29 Problems 
arise when the ballot is placed incorrectly in the machine or if the user 
fails to properly punch through the perforation.30 This could result in 
unintentional undervoting. The system is now obsolete.31  
4. Optical-Scan Ballots 
 First becoming available in the 1980’s, “Marksense” or optical-
scan technology is a paper-based technology that utilizes computers to 
do the counting.32 Voters typically use a pen to mark their ballots by 
filling in an oval or completing an arrow next to their selections, after 
25 Id.; Henry E. Brady et al., Survey Research Ctr. and Inst. of Governmental Studies, Univ. 
of Cal., Berkeley, Counting All the Votes: The Performance of Voting Technology in the 
United States, note 23, at 10 (2001). 
26 MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF ELECTION 
REFORM 30 (2012). 
27 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1719; Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Voting: What Is, What 
Could Be, 18 note 30 at 20 (2001), available at 
https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/VTP01.pdf.  
28 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1720. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 30. 
32 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1721. 
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which the ballots are counted by a scanner.33 This system is akin to 
taking a standardized test.34  
 Once marked, the ballots can either be counted at a central 
location or counted there at the precinct.35 Though, there is a 
particular advantage to the use of the precinct-count method: voters 
are given the opportunity to discover and correct any potential 
errors.36 In vote-by-mail jurisdictions, voters are sent an optical-scan 
ballot to be returned.37 As of 2010, more than 48.5% of counties in the 
country relied upon optical-scan to tabulate votes.38 However, optical-
scan ballots are not without their own risks. The ballots may be found 
erroneous as a result of either stray markings or by failing to use the 
proper type of marking device.39 Additionally, only some optical-scan 
equipment allows voters to check for errors at the precinct.40 
5. Electronic Voting
 The fifth category of voting technology, and the one that is the 
focus of this note, is electronic voting. E-voting can generally be 
broken into two sub-categories.41 First, conventional e-voting, using 
Direct Record Electronic machines (DREs), which are stand-alone 
units, record votes in their internal memories.42 They are generally not 
33 Id. at 1722. 
34 Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/voting-system-standards-testing-and-certification.aspx. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 31. 
38 Id. at 29. 
39 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1722. 
40 Id. 
41 T.M. Buchsbaum, E-Voting: International Developments and Lessons Learnt, in P-47 
ELECTRONIC VOTING IN EUROPE TECHNOLOGY, LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 31, 31-34 
(Alexander Prosser & Robert Krimmer eds., 2004).  
42 Id. 
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connected to the Internet.43 With DREs, the voting process is 
physically supervised by representatives of the government—usually 
poll workers—as with other types of in-precinct voting processes. 
 The current generation of DREs uses a touchscreen that functions 
much like an ATM interface.44 Voters using these DREs generally 
receive a plastic “smart” card that is inserted into the machine and 
causes that voter’s ballot to be displayed, after which the voter may 
then make his or her selections by simply touching the screen.45 
Typically, at the end of the ballot, voters are shown a confirmation 
screen allowing the voter to verify that the selections are correct.46 
These systems do not allow voters to overvote, and they will inform 
the voter of any undervotes ensuring that any omissions are 
intentional.47 As of the 2010 election, 33.5% of counties across the 
country used DREs.48  
 The second sub-category of electronic voting is remote e-voting, or 
I-voting.  Instead of voting on a machine at a designated location, 
voters mark and cast their votes outside the polling place. This 
includes voting from the comforts of the voter’s home on the internet, 
smartphones, or at a public open-air kiosk (fixed-location). So 
defined, I-voting includes processes through which voters use a 
computer both to mark and to submit their votes; it also includes 
voters’ submission of a hand-marked ballot over the Internet.49  
III. LAWS GOVERNING VOTING TECHNOLOGY
 Both the federal and state governments have adopted laws 
regulating voting and voting technology. These include laws designed 
to protect against disenfranchisement as well as those that provide 
minimum standards for voting technology. This part first discusses 
43 Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1722. 
44 Id. at 1723. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 29. 
49 See Internet Voting, VERIFIED VOTING, https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/ 
internet-voting (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).  
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applicable federal laws, then the state laws governing voting 
technology. It further analyzes how those laws contribute to the 
stagnation of voting technology today.  
A. Federal Law 
 The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides the power 
to the states to determine the “Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives,” but that Congress be 
allowed to “make or alter such Regulations.”50 As such, the states are 
given broad powers to administer elections as they see fit. While the 
individual states have historically been the primary regulators and 
overseers of congressional elections, Congress has intervened from 
time to time The first such occurrence was in 1842, when Congress 
mandated that states electing more than one member of the House of 
Representatives do so by districts rather than at-large.51  
 Today, three federal statutes are especially pertinent to voting 
technology. One such statute is the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) of 1973, which was designed to 
require states to permit military personnel and civilians residing 
outside the United States to register and to vote via absentee ballot.52 
UOCAVA plays an important role in the limited experimentation that 
this country has engaged in with its first attempts at exploring I-
voting. In order to assist military and overseas voters in casting their 
ballots, Congress established the Federal Voting Assistance Program 
(FVAP) to help implement the UOCAVA voting procedures.53 In order 
to cast an absentee ballot, the overseas citizen need only obtain a 
Federal Post Card Application and submit to their respective county 
board of election.54 However, UOCAVA, as a federal program, fails to 
take into account individual state election requirements.55 For 
example, states differ on duration of the registration window, when 
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
51 Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 48, sec. 2, 5 Stat 491 (1842) (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. § 2c (2014)). 
52 52 U.S.C. § 20302 (1986). 
53 R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK, AND VOTE: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNET VOTING 135 (2004).  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 136. 
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the applications need to be received, and whether or not the 
application needs to be witnessed or notarized.56  
 The more notable and pertinent federal legislation germane to this 
note is the Help America Vote Act of 2002,57 what has been called the 
most important federal law governing election administration.58 After 
HAVA’s enactment, states and localities used appropriated federal 
money to invest in new voting machines and equipment.59 HAVA 
authorized $650 million in funding to the states to help replace 
punch-card ballots and lever voting machines.60 HAVA also 
authorized over $3 billion in requirements payments for disbursement 
to the states to aid in meeting HAVA’s requirements. This included the 
implementation of provisional voting, the creation of statewide voter 
registration databases, and the effectuation of HAVA’s mandate that 
certain first-time voters provide identification at their polling 
location.61  
 In addition, HAVA sets minimal mandates for voting systems 
across the country, while at the same time encouraging states to 
upgrade to better technology by providing incentives. HAVA was 
designed to achieve five main outcomes: (1) a one-time upgrade to 
voting technology; (2) local notification regarding overvoting and 
undervoting; (3) the creation of statewide voter registration 
databases; (4) increased list integrity via voter identification as part of 
the voter registration process; and finally (5) an upgrade in 
accessibility for voters with disabilities.62 As a result of HAVA’s 
enactment, roughly 70% of counties have switched to new voting 
equipment since 2000, with the bulk doing so before the 2006 
deadline.63  
56 Id.  
57 Nou, supra note 10, at 750. 
58 Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 20901 (2002). 
59 Nou, supra note 10, at 750. 
60 Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424, 
428 (2004). 
61 HAVA § 21007, §21082-21083; Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1733-34. 
62 Matthew M. Damschroder, Of Money, Machines, and Management: Election 
Administration from an Administrator’s Perspective, 12 ELECTION L.J. 195, 195 (2003).  
63 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 33. 
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 HAVA does not mandate the implementation of electronic voting, 
with the exception that at least one DRE machine, or similarly 
accessible unit, be available at each polling place.64 HAVA requires 
that people with disabilities be afforded accommodation with voting 
machines that offer the same access as for other voters, including 
privacy and independence.65 
 Additionally, HAVA placed significant responsibilities over voting 
technology in the hands of the EAC.66 Comprised of four 
Presidentially-appointed and Senatorially-confirmed members, the 
EAC is an independent bipartisan commission created by HAVA 
charged with developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, in 
addition to providing voting system guidelines, and auditing the use of 
HAVA funds.67 The EAC was responsible for administering the $3 
billion in “requirements payments” to the states.68 However, as one 
commentator has put it, “[t]he [EAC] was designed to have as little 
regulatory power as possible,” as there are just four members 
comprising the body, and three members are required for approval to 
undertake any action.69 Some of the duties of the EAC include 
conducting studies on election administration70 and researching 
methods of improving access for those with disabilities and those who 
are not proficient in English.71 Though the EAC’s decisions are not 
binding on the states, it does have the duty to provide guidance.72 The 
board sat vacant from 2011 until 2015, when three new commissioners 
were finally sworn in.73 A fourth candidate has been nominated.74 
64 52 U.S.C. § 21083. 
65 Id. at § 21083(a)(3)(A). 
66 52 U.S.C. § 20941; Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1733.  
67 About Us, UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, http://www.eac.gov/ 
about_the_eac (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).  
68 52 U.S.C. §21001. 
69 Shambon, supra note 60, at 428. 
70 52 U.S.C. §20922. 
71 52 U.S.C. §21041. 
72 52 U.S.C. §20922. 
73 Kevin Coleman & Eric Fischer, The Help America Vote Act and Election Administration: 
Overview and Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20898 (2015).  
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Additionally, the EAC was left unfunded for several years until the 
passage of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations 
Act of 2015, which provided $10 million75 to the EAC for the rest of 
2015.76 
 Apart from the bipartisan commission, the EAC’s 110-member 
standards board77 has the ability to recommend standards for the 
design of election material.78 The most recent iteration of these 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines was approved in March of 2015.79 
However, these are voluntary, meaning that the states cannot be 
forced to comply with the standards.80 Despite their voluntary nature, 
as of March 2015, forty-seven states had implemented the EAC’s 
standards at least partially.81 As a result of finally meeting quorum, 
the Standards Board had its first meeting since February 2011 in April 
2015.82 
 HAVA required the EAC to conduct periodic studies on election 
administration, noting that “[t]he purpose of these studies is to 
promote methods for voting and administering elections, including 
provisional voting, that are convenient, accessible and easy to use; 
that yield accurate, secure and expeditious voting systems; that afford 
each registered and eligible voter an equal opportunity to vote and to 
have that vote counted; and that are efficient.”83  
74 Id. 
75 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 83, 113th Cong. 
(2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/83. 
76 Coleman & Fischer, supra note 73, at 13-14. 
77 Standards Board, U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 
http://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/standards_board.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
78 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 13. 
79 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, EAC Updates Federal Voting System Guidelines, 
at 1 (Mar. 31, 2015), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/ 
EAC%20Updates%20Federal%20Voting%20System%20Guidelines-News-Release-FINAL-
3-31-15-website.pdf. 
80 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 13.  
81 EAC Updates Federal Voting System Guidelines, supra note 79, at 2.  
82 Standards Board, U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, supra note 77. 
83 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 26, at 27 (citing to Report to the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission On Best Practices to Improve Provisional Voting, EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF 
POLITICS, at 5).  
340 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:2 
 All the benefits and best-intentions of EAC aside, the Act is not 
without its problems. As Matthew Damschroder, the Director of 
Elections for the Ohio Secretary of State, has written, HAVA’s race by 
the states to spend the appropriated money created two problems: (1) 
“putting the cart before the horse,” and (2) “ongoing costs.”84 “Putting 
the cart before the horse” references the fact that four years passed 
from the EAC’s inaugural meeting on March 23, 2004, until the first 
voting system was fully tested and certified as meeting the EAC's first 
construction of post-HAVA standards.85 During the intervening years, 
nearly all election jurisdictions selected HAVA-compliant systems and 
used them in at least one federal election.86 Put simply, the decision 
required the purchase of modern voting systems before modern 
standards had been adopted.87 As for “ongoing costs,” in contrast to 
older voting technologies such as lever-mechanical and optical-scan 
machines, which, if properly maintained, can be used for years, the 
HAVA-compliant DRE machines require licensing and software, only 
the initial costs of which were covered by HAVA funds.88 Annual 
maintenance per each DRE machine is estimated to be between $100 
and $200.89  
 In addition to the two problems identified by Damschroder, a 
third is stagnation in the development of better voting technologies. 
Without further guidance from the EAC on how best to utilize funds 
appropriated to the states, states will be hesitant to spend the money. 
While HAVA attempted to correct many problems in our voting 
system, it did not solve everything. HAVA was intended to provide a 
one-time infusion of funds for updating voting technology and other 
improvements.90 It has been nearly thirteen years since HAVA’s 
enactment, and given the lack of state resources, and the absence of 
84 Damschroder, supra note 62, at 196-98. 
85 Id. at 197.  
86 Id. at 197-98. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Voting Equipment, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voting-equipment.aspx. 
90 Damschroder, supra note 62, at 195. 
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ongoing federal funding, stagnation has now emerged as the central 
problem in voting technology.91  
B. State Law 
 In addition to federal law, three areas of state election law are 
essential to the backdrop of how to improve existing voting 
technology: (1) absentee voting and ballot retention requirements; (2) 
audit and paper record requirements; and (3) voter privacy 
requirements. Each will be discussed briefly in turn.  
1. Absentee Ballot Retention 
 Dramatic differences exist among the states concerning early and 
absentee voting. In thirty-three states and Washington D.C., a voter 
may cast his or her ballot before Election Day without excuse during a 
specified time period.92 In twenty states, a voter must provide an 
excuse when requesting an absentee ballot.93 Some states even go so 
far as to offer a permanent absentee ballot, meaning that once a voter 
has requested an absentee ballot, then for each subsequent election, 
that voter will be mailed an absentee ballot without further requests.94 
Finally, three states rely solely on mail voting, meaning no precinct 
voting.95 
 State laws also differ in the types of technology through which 
voters may submit their ballots. Two states allow for the submission of 
a ballot via fax, e-mail, or web upload.96 However, eighteen states do 
not allow electronic submission, and absentee voters must return their 
ballots by mail or in person.97 Twenty states, as well as the District of 
91 See id. at 198. 
92 Absentee and Early Voting, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 11, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-
voting.aspx [hereinafter Absentee and Early Voting]. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (These states include Colorado, Washington, and Oregon). 
96 Electronic Transmission of Ballots, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/internet-
voting.aspx.  
97 Id. 
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Columbia, allow the return of a ballot via e-mail.98 Finally, 
approximately half of the states permit voters to transmit absentee 
ballots via the internet, though, for the majority, this right is limited to 
those serving in the military or residing abroad.99 All told, thirty-two 
states, including Washington, D.C., allow for some kind of electronic 
submission, either via e-mail or via fax.100 
2. Audit and VVPAT Requirements 
 State law also proscribes the rules concerning audits and recounts 
of elections. Auditability refers to the maintenance of a record than 
can be viewed post-election.101 Since HAVA, the dominant concern has 
been that electronic voting machines may be subject to possible error 
or even manipulation.102 For this reason, more than half the states 
require a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), with some making 
the paper record the official ballot.103 According to the EAC, eighteen 
states employ DRE’s with a VVPAT.104 Under current regulations, I-
voting seems unlikely in those states in which VVPAT’s are now 
required, as “[t]he voter is not at the point of vote summarization to 
examine a receipt.”105 For I-voting’s implementation, the VVPAT 
obstacle would have to be overcome.  
3. Voter Privacy Requirements 
 While the United States Supreme Court has mentioned that the 
right to vote privately through a secret ballot is an essential aspect of 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, supra note 34. 
102 Voter Verified Paper Record Legislation, VERIFIED VOTING (2014) 
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/vvpr-legislation. 
103 Id. 
104 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE 
COMMISSION, at 15 (2013), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/990-
050%20EAC%20VoterSurvey_508Compliant.pdf. 
105 SALTMAN, supra note 13, at 211. 
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democracy,106 states have adopted their own rules on voter privacy. 
Nevada’s statute is typical in providing that “[a] 
mechanical voting system must secure to the voter privacy and 
independence in the act of voting.”107 Alabama’s statute similarly 
states that “[t]he voting system shall ensure that any 
notification required under this section preserves the privacy of the 
voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.”108 The underlying concern 
of such privacy statutes is that voters should not be able to 
demonstrate how they voted to one another.  
 Historically, the goal here has been to protect voters from 
outsiders who may wish to punish those who vote "the wrong way" or 
reward those who vote "the right way."109 Therefore, to protect voters, 
an individual’s vote must be secret.110 These statutes are particularly 
applicable to the topic of I-voting, because moving our ballot-casting 
abilities online might risk voter privacy in a way that voting at an 
official location does not. As an example, if someone were capable of 
hacking into the computer system hosting the voting process, then the 
concern would be that the hacker would then be able to see how each 
person voted.111 However, it should be noted that such a concern also 
applies to absentee ballots, and it’s not clear that the concern is 
substantially greater in regards to I-voting. For example, with 
absentee voting there are issues with ballot tracking, not to mention 
the basic concern of unwanted voter identification and voter 
verification.112 Is this ballot really being cast by the noted sender? To 
the degree that these concerns as applied to absentee ballots can be 
106 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992). 
107 N.R.S. 293B.065 (2004). 
108 ALA. CODE § 17-2-4(a)(3) (1975) (current through 2015). 
109 Douglas W. Jones, Voting on Paper Ballots, THE UNIV. OF IOWA DEP’T OF COMPUTER 
SCI., http://homepage.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/paper.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
110 Id. 
111 See Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Dangers of Internet Voting, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (July 14, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/07/the-
dangers-of-internet-voting. 
112 For a general discussion regarding the concerns of absentee voting, see What’s Wrong 
With Voting By Mail or Absentee Ballot, THE NO VOTE BY MAIL PROJECT (Feb. 20, 2008), 
https://novbm.wordpress.com/2008/02/20/whats-wrong-with-voting-by-mail-or-
absentee-ballot. 
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mitigated, it is unclear that this can be accomplished with greater 
success than as applied to I-voting.  
IV. PREVIOUS EXPERIMENTS WITH I-VOTING
 I-voting has been either implemented or at least tested both in the 
United States and abroad. One EAC report found more than thirty 
Internet voting experiments in thirteen different countries as of 
2011.113 The first such use of the Internet for a vote in U.S. elections 
took place in 2000.114 Since then, most uses of I-Voting in the U.S. 
have been for military and overseas voters.115 In fact, the EAC recently 
noted that “the internet is the election lifeline for many military and 
overseas voters, in particular.”116 However, as will be noted further in 
Part V, these efforts at utilizing I-voting are not without concern. In 
light of these security risks, some of the thirty or so states that do 
allow I-voting for service members now require the voters to sign a 
form stipulating the voter comprehends that by using that system the 
ballot may not be secret.117 Outside of the U.S., computer and I-voting 
technology is being implemented at least partially in some stage of the 
electoral process.118 
A. Experiments in the U.S. 
 The past fifteen years have seen several I-voting experiments in 
the U.S. While some of these experiments have been considered 
113 See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Testing and Certification Technical Paper #2: 
A Survey of Internet Voting, 96. Sept. 14, 2011.  
114 See, generally, MICHAEL R. ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS: THE 
PERILS AND PROMISES OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 124-37 (Princeton University Press 2008). 
115 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION 
MELTDOWN 162 (Yale University Press 2012); Donald S. Inbody, Voting by Overseas 
Citizens and Deployed Military Personnel, at 2 (CalTech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, 
Working Paper No. 119, 2013).  
116 2014 EAC Report, supra note 4, at 59. 
117 Elizabeth Weise, Internet Voting Not ‘Ready for Primetime,’ USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2014, 
http://www.krem.com/story/news/politics/elections/2014/11/04/internet-
voting/18483425/. 
118 Dimitrios Zissis & Dimitrios Lekka, Securing e-Government and e-Voting with an Open 
Cloud Computing Architecture, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 28, 241 (2011). 
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successful, each has raised significant concerns. In the U.S., I-voting 
has generally received a chilly reception despite its arguably greater 
success than in some experiments abroad.  
 A 2010 trial in the District of Columbia illustrates the concerns 
surrounding I-Voting. The District established an experimental 
system that allowed voters to go online, enter an ID code they had 
received through the mail, cast a ballot, and then receive a receipt of 
the result.119 It then invited the public to hack the system.120 It didn’t 
take long for three computer scientists from the University of 
Michigan to find an error in the source code that “allowed [them] to 
completely steal the election,” including altering the selection of 
candidates appearing on the screen.121 Similar small-scale “hackathon” 
experiments have been conducted in New York City and San 
Francisco.122 For broader implementation to stand a chance at 
success, security would have to be enhanced to prevent this sort of 
hacking.  
 Despite these historical problems, some jurisdictions have taken 
steps toward implementation of I-voting on a larger scale. Three states 
have utilized I-voting: Alaska, Arizona, and Michigan.123  
 The Alaska Republican party turned to I-voting to aid in turnout 
for its statewide straw poll in 2000.124 Alaska would appear to be the 
ideal candidate for such a test due to its large geography and voters’ 
sporadic residences.125 Alaska also has the highest computer 
ownership and internet access rates of any state.126 The straw poll was 
119 Talbot, supra note 8. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Miranda Neubauer, Voting Information Project Prepares San Francisco Hackathon, 
TECHJOURNAL (Mar. 24, 2014), http://techpresident.com/news/24847/voting-
information-project-prepares-san-francisco-hackathon. 
123 See ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting, supra note 
53, at 125; Joshua F. Clowers, I E-Vote, U I-Vote, Why Can’t We All Just Vote?!, 42 GONZ. 
L. REV. 61, 87 (2006); Alicia Kolar Prevost, Assessing Internet Voting as an Early Voting 
Reform in the United States, GI-Edition: Lecture Notes in Informatics, 3rd International 
Conference on Electronic Voting 68 (2008). 
124 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, and Vote, supra note 53, at 125. 
125 Id. at 124. 
126 Id. at 125 (citing to a report by the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA), A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the 
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confined to those located in the most remote and inaccessible locales 
of the state.127 Of the 3,500 individuals who were eligible to vote in the 
online Republican straw pool, each of whom received a digital 
identification and a form that needed to be returned to the party, only 
fifty-six returned the form, and only thirty-five actually utilized the 
Internet to cast their ballots.128  
Alaska has also experimented with I-voting on a broader scale. Since 
2012, Alaska has allowed all absentee voters to cast their ballot over 
the Internet as part of its “Secure Online Voting Solution.”129 As a part 
of the Solution, any qualified registered voter may apply for an 
electronic transmission ballot.130 The voter receives an e-mail with a 
link prompting the voter to log into the “secure online delivery 
system.”131 Once logged in, the voter makes his or her ballot selections. 
Upon completion, the voter is required to print a certificate and voter 
identification sheet, both of which must be signed in the presence of 
an authorized official or someone over the age of 18.132 The voter may 
then scan the document and submit via the secure online delivery 
system.133 Alaska’s Division of Elections informs voters on its website 
that they are voluntarily waiving theirs rights “to a secret ballot and 
are assuming the risk that a faulty transmission may occur.”134 Despite 
this warning, Verified Voting has criticized Alaska for its 
experimentation with I-voting, given that the margin of victory in a 
U.S. Senate race may be smaller than the number of votes cast over 
the Internet.135  
Internet, NTIA: OFFICE OF POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT (Feb. 2002), 
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/index.html.) 
127 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, and Vote, supra note 53, at 125. 
128 Id. This amounts to a mere 1%.  
129 Weise, supra note 117. 
130 Absentee Voting by Electronic Transmission, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, 
https://www.elections.alaska.gov/vi_bb_by_fax.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
131 Id.  
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Weise, supra note 117. 
135 Id. 
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 The 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary was conducted using 
optional I-voting,136 and in fact, voting via the Internet was the most 
popular choice among voters given their four choices.137 In Arizona, 
voters received a personal identification number (PIN) in the mail and 
a form to request a traditional paper absentee ballot.138 Then, for 
about four days, voters could go online to either the Arizona 
Democratic Party’s website, or election.com139 in order to cast their 
ballot.140 The website used the PIN and two personal questions to 
ascertain the identity of the voter.141 Difficulties encountered involved 
lost PINs and the inability to obtain a PIN from the Democratic 
Party.142  
 The Michigan Democratic Party also used I-voting technology for 
its primary in 2004.143 With 162,929144 voters participating in the 
primary, 28.4%, or 46,272 people, cast their ballot via the internet.145 
In many respects, the I-ballot used in the primary was very similar to 
the traditional absentee ballot, which a voter places in a secret 
envelope to prevent election workers and others from seeing how that 
individual voted.146 However, voters did not seem to express any 
concern with privacy violations, despite the chance that an election 
worker may see how that individual voted.147  
136 Clowers, supra note 123, at 87; Brett Stohs, Is I-Voting I-Legal?, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 1, n. 1, ¶ 6 (2003). 
137 Id. 
138 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, Vote, supra note 53, at 128. 
139 This was the group running the I-voting process. 
140 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, Vote, supra note 53, at 128. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 134.  
143 Prevost, supra note 123. 
144 14.5% voted by traditional mail-in absentee, while 57.1% voted in-person at a caucus 
location the day of the election. Id.  
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
348 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:2 
 An experiment in the late 1990’s was launched by FVAP to 
determine whether a secure Internet registration and voting system 
could be feasible for actual voters to cast binding votes in the 2000 
general election.148 After spending just over $6 million dollars, the 
Voting Over the Internet Project was able to ensure a very high degree 
of security.149 UOCAVA participants received a CD-ROM with software 
needed to register and vote.150 Voters were also required to have a 
Department of Defense-issued digital certificate to ensure voter 
authentication, however the issuance of these certificates was slow, 
and many voters were unable to download the certificate onto a floppy 
disc that would be used in the voting process.151  
 However, for those who were successful in properly downloading 
the certificate and had received approval from their local election 
officer of their registration and absentee ballot requests, the voter 
could then begin a voting session by logging in to a central server on 
which the digital certificate was verified.152 After successfully logging 
onto the server, the server then sent a request for an electronic ballot 
to the local election office to be delivered to the workstation.153 Once 
the ballot had been completed and submitted, if received by the local 
election office, the voter was then sent an electronic receipt.154 
 Another project which aimed to address the needs of military 
voters was the result of a Congressional mandate to develop an 
Internet-based application.155 The Secure Electronic Registration and 
Voting Experiment (SERVE) project, though planned to be utilized in 
the November 2004 general election, was eventually killed by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz after an advisory group issued a 
148 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, Vote, supra note 53, at 137. 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 138.  
153 Id. 
154 Id.  
155 Charles Stewart, III, Voting Technologies, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 353, 360 (2011).  
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negative report regarding security issues.156 The project was shut 
down just one week after the issuance of the report.157  
 The number of experiments involving I-voting in the United States 
is small. Moreover, the experiments that have taken place have not 
done so on a large scale. More tests with a bigger voting base will be 
necessary to thoroughly vet the idea of I-voting before any sort of 
broad implementation could be deemed possible.  
B. Experiments Abroad
 Many other countries have experimented with I-voting.,158 but the 
vast majority of experimentation has taken place in Europe.159 Estonia 
has had the most extensive experience with I-voting.160 In fact, it is the 
only country in the world that depends on I-voting in a significant 
manner for national elections, with about 20-25% of voters using I-
voting for its parliamentary elections.161 Estonia used I-voting 
beginning in 2005, but its first large-scale use came in its 2007 
parliamentary elections, in which more than 31,000 votes were cast 
using I-voting.162 I-voting has been used in eight binding Estonian 
elections.163  
 Recently, an international team of experts observed the system 
during municipal elections, and found so many problems that the 
156 Id. at 360.  
157 SALTMAN, supra note 13, at 211. 
158 See E.A.C. Technical Paper #2, supra note 113. 
159 Id. 
160 Take Two, Why Can’t Americans Vote Online Yet?, 89.3KPCC (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.scpr.org/programs/take-two/2014/10/23/39965/why-can-t-americans-vote-
online-yet/. 
161 J. Alex Halderman et al., Press Release: Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia, 
ESTONIA VOTING (May 12, 2014), https://estoniaevoting.org/press-release. 
162 Epp Maaten & Thad Hall, Improving the Transparency of Remote E-Voting: The 
Estonian Experience, GI-Edition Lecture Notes in Informatic, 3rd International Conference 
on Electronic Voting, 32 (2008); National Electoral Committee of Estonia: Parliamentary 
Elections 2007 – Statistics of e-voting, http://www.vvk.ee/english/Ivoting_stat_eng.pdf.  
163 National Electoral Committee of Estonia, http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-
estonia (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).  
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team recommended immediate cessation of the I-voting process.164 
Harri Hursti, an independent security researcher, commented that the 
“computers could have easily been compromised by criminals or 
foreign hackers, undermining the security of the whole system.”165 The 
team was able to successfully attack the I-voting system, despite the 
presence of safeguards, through malware that would silently steal 
votes unbeknownst to others through vote-stealing software that 
attacked the tabulating server that produced the final vote count.166 As 
a result, the team unanimously recommended the discontinuation of 
I-voting until there may be fundamental advances in computer 
security.167 However, proponents of Estonia’s system argue that the I-
voting scheme there achieves transparency in three areas: 
political/legal legitimacy, voter transparency, and system 
transparency.168 In support, proponents note I-voting technology was 
able to detect 789 repeated I-votes as well as cancel thirty-two I-votes 
because the voter also submitted a paper ballot.169  
 The United Kingdom, European Union, and Switzerland have 
experimented with I-voting as well. Compared to the U.S., national 
governments in Europe tend to play a greater role in the electoral 
process, the process is generally simpler, and the trials have generally 
been much smaller in scope than in the United States.170 In the UK, 
the Electoral Commission held a series of small controlled trials in 
2002 and 2003 to study I-voting with the goal of increasing voter 
turnout.171 The studies were conducted in five different city/borough 
council elections.172 While the studies did not find strong evidence of 
increased voter turnout, the Electoral Commission’s report did find 
that “[t]hose who voted appeared to find the procedures relatively 
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165 Id.  
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easy to use; and even among those who did not vote there was also 
positive feedback about the convenience of the methods available.”173 
 As for the European Union, trials have been held in small-scale 
elections in the cities of Issy-les-Moulineaux, France; Stockholm, 
Sweden; and Bremen, Germany.174 The tests each demonstrated the 
possibilities for success with regard to targeting a certain population 
of voters,175 and for success with regard to security through strongly-
encrypted smartcards.176 The Issy-les-Moulineaux trial demonstrated 
that the system was not effective when voters had certain types of 
firewall specification on their networks, but Cybervote, the group 
sponsored by the EU to conduct the test, was able to modify the 
system to address this particular problem.177  
 The Stockholm trial was conducted in 2003 to assess how I-voting 
might be used to support local government decision-making.178 Given 
that many voters were immigrants and did not speak Swedish, the 
trial assessed the difficulties in implementing I-voting with different 
populations, and the trial revealed that such an implementation was 
indeed possible with such populations.179  
 The 2003 Bremen trial made use of I-voting with university 
elections, and was specifically geared towards testing three aspects of 
I-voting: online voter registration; digital signatures and smart cards 
for authentications; and multiple race/issue elections.180 The test 
concluded that with strong encryption and the use of smartcards that 
 
 
 
 
173 Id. (quoting Modernising Elections: A Strategic Evaluation of the 2002 Electoral Pilot 
Schemes, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (August 2002)). 
174 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, Vote, supra note 53, at 143-44. 
175 The Stockholm test was geared to those aged 55 and over. Id. at 144.  
176 The Bremen test demonstrated how Germany’s federalist system, akin to that of the 
U.S., also frequently required the combination of multiple elections on one ballot. The test 
was conducted in a multi-race university election to simulate this bifurcated system. Id. at 
144.  
177 Id. 
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
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a secure multi-race election was possible.181 However, this was a 
small-scale test and voter turnout was low.182 
 Switzerland tested an I-voting system in 2003.183 While only 323 
voters cast their ballot using the I-voting method, the result was 
without incident, and this number represented about 43.6% of all 
voters in that election.184 The Swiss government hired a team of 
“white-hat” hackers to try to hack the I-voting security, but it failed to 
do so during the two-day window during which voters could cast their 
ballots.185 
 Though there have been several experiments with I-voting, the 
results have been largely inclusive. Numerous concerns regarding 
cybersecurity have been raised. The experiments have also shown the 
potential I-voting has to promote access. Part V discusses these perils 
and promises.  
V. THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF I-VOTING 
 When discussing I-voting, multiple values come into play. On the 
one hand, there is the desire to encourage technological innovation, 
make voting more accessible, and to provide greater access to the 
ballot box. On the other hand is the desire to protect accuracy and the 
need to ensure transparency in our electoral process.186 As previous 
experiments with I-voting illustrate, security is the greatest obstacle to 
any wide-spread implementation of I-voting in the United States. In 
determining the path forward on I-voting, it is essential to consider 
both its risks and potential benefits.  
 Section A addresses several of the security and transparency 
concerns surrounding I-voting. Section B discusses some of the 
potential benefits from expanded use of I-voting.  
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
183 Id. at 145. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. 
186 See Nou, supra note 10, at 793; see also Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1796. 
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A. The Perils 
 As the CalTech/MIT voting technology project wrote in the wake 
of our last voting technology meltdown: “Losing confidence in 
elections means losing confidence in our system of government.”187 At 
present, there are too many questions surrounding I-voting 
technology for its implementation to be practical, let alone to instill 
confidence in our electoral system and thus our government.188 In 
order for I-voting to succeed, we must “develop vigorous market 
incentives for innovation safeguarded by greater public inspection and 
transparency. Legitimate elections demand mechanisms that can 
ensure robust oversight without stifling advances in voting technology 
and security.”189 The development of such mechanisms requires clear-
eyed analysis of the major threats to voter confidence in I-voting: 
security, accuracy, and privacy.  
1. Security 
 The greatest concern with I-voting technology is the lack of 
security safeguards. As Professor Hoke has written, “[t]he bottom line 
security point: use of all-electronic voting equipment without quality 
assurance techniques that rely on a tangible record of the voter’s 
choices independent of the electronic equipment permits nefarious 
conduct to convert voting rights into an illusion.”190  
 Of course, security is a serious concern. The scientific community 
has yet to find a method for creating bug-free software.191 Dan 
Wallach, professor of computer science at Rice University, aptly 
describes the problem: “It turns out to be really hard to build a 
network system that’s hard to break into… JPMorgan, Target and 
Home Depot have learned that lesson, and they have far more money 
and expertise available to them than local election officials.”192 
Businesses aren’t the only ones prone to attack. Virtually every major 
187 See Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, supra note 27. 
188 Clowers, supra note 123, at 88.  
189 Nou, supra note 10, at 750.  
190 Hoke, supra note 5, at 1018. 
191 Nou, supra note 10, at 785. 
192 Weise, supra note 117; see also Nou, supra note 10, at 785. 
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U.S. government and defense industry network has been breached 
with some form of cyber-attack despite their own protections, leading 
many cyber security experts to conclude that there’s no basis to 
believe that an internet-based election would not be falsified in some 
manner.193 By moving voting online there are simply additional points 
where those who would wish to tamper with elections would have 
opportunities.194  
 Fraud is a major concern with I-voting. By adding an additional 
avenue for voters to cast their ballots, another avenue is also created 
for altering election results by adding or deleting votes. Potential areas 
for fraud include malicious payload threats, denial-of service attacks, 
and spoofing.195 In a malicious payload threat a hacker could program 
a virus to destroy computers or take control of the computer.196 
Denial-of-service attacks occur when a computer, or multiple 
computers, sends a series of messages that effectively flood the 
system’s traffic.197 Finally, “spoofing” is an attempt to make an 
individual believe that what he/she is receiving is legitimate when it in 
fact is not.198 Hackers could take advantage of less computer-
sophisticated individuals and fraudulently steal an election. For 
successful implementation, any concerns of fraud would need to be 
severely limited if not altogether eliminated.  
 In considering the widespread implementation of I-voting, it is 
important to recognize the difference between voting and commerce. 
Just because something may work in the world of e-commerce, does 
not necessarily mean that something will work in the world of e-
voting. The requirements of security, privacy, and transparency in 
voting are stricter than for commerce. Accordingly, “security 
mechanisms that make e-commerce transactions relatively safe for 
(consumers at least) are not sufficient to guarantee the safety of online 
voting.”199 Quite simply, it is easier to detect e-commerce errors and 
193 Hoke, supra note 5, at 1020.  
194 Weise, supra note 117. 
195 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, Vote, supra note 53, at 83-84. 
196 Id. at 83.  
197 Id. at 83.  
198 Id. at 84. 
199 David Jefferson, If I can Shop and Bank Online, Why Can’t I Vote Online?, VERIFIED 
VOTING, https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/vote-online (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
2016] WEAVER 355 
fraud than it may be to detect online election fraud.200 This is because, 
unlike when shopping online, there are no receipts, no double-entry 
bookkeeping, and no audit trail information for those who vote 
online201 The lack of this individualized paper trail is due to the need 
to protect against voters being able to demonstrate to others how they 
voted.202 Since individualized paper receipts of how an individual 
voted are prohibited, in contrast to e-commerce, it’s harder to verify 
that the “transaction” occurred. 
 At first glance, e-commerce appears to be safer than e-voting. 
“Appears” being the key word. First, it must be understood that e-
voting is nothing like e-commerce.203 For example, with voting, there 
must be a wall between the voter and the ballot, even after the vote 
has been counted to ensure voter anonymity.204 In e-commerce there 
is no such requirement as we have traceable names and credit 
cards.205 Also, and perhaps more importantly, the solutions for 
protecting against fraud are different for e-voting and e-commerce. 
Further, online voting must be secured through cryptography, 
whereas e-commerce is secured simply through insurance.206 
However, as it stands, encryption may not be enough for addressing 
issues of integrity, confidentiality and authenticity.207 Hence, there is a 
need for a multi-tiered approach with voting security. 
 Additional concerns are raised by the remote e-voter’s personal 
computer (or other device), as it is the weakest link in the chain to 
providing for a secure and accurate election.208 Voters’ home 
computers are far more likely to have less security protections 
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installed than a corporate computer.209 However, if authentication of a 
voter over a secure channel could be achieved for the limited amount 
of time that is necessary for casting a ballot, vulnerability issues could 
be limited.210 This authentication process coupled with cryptography 
may potentially allow the voter to come within this centralized 
“security perimeter.”211 This centralization of security is critical, as it 
allows for a uniform method to manage risk from the operation and 
use of information systems for both individuals and for nations.212 
 This sort of security centralization was seen in the 2000 SafeVote 
experiment. According to SafeVote’s Public Election Network, the 
experiment relied upon firewalls, reverse-proxy configuration, 
intrusion detection systems, as well as effectively unknown/changing 
IP addresses.”213 Using this system in 2000, SafeVote’s Public Election 
Network conducted a public attack test, and attackers failed to even 
locate the servers managing the vote.214 If such security technology 
could be replicated and maintained on a grand scale, a voter at home 
could potentially link his or her computer to a system with protective 
security measures, much like that utilized by SafeVote, to ensure this 
same level of security.215 
 While it may seem that hackers are always one step ahead, 
SafeVote contends that its use of multiple security functions ensures 
reliability as it is far less likely that a successful hacker could disable 
more than one system.216 While one security mechanism is generally 
insufficient, “as no control must be considered a gold standard,” a 
layered solution can ebb a flow of vulnerabilities.217 Such layering of 
security measures, as demonstrated by the SafeVote experiment, 
would have to be overseen and monitored by the government, which 
could be done through commissioning studies focusing on security 
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measures that would ultimately affect the feasibility of conducting 
remote elections.218 
2. Accuracy 
 Another inherent concern with I-voting is its alleged inability to 
ensure accuracy as compared to other voting methods. For example, 
with paper trails on DRE’s, there’s the option for an election official to 
verify that the machine is indeed functioning properly. By contrast, for 
the hypothetical citizen exercising the right to vote from the comforts 
of home, there would be no centralized way to maintain any paper 
record. Adding to this concern is that a record generated through I-
voting could be used to demonstrate to another individual how one 
voted, perhaps for vote-buying purposes.219 Just as in regards to 
DRE’s the voter cannot walk off with the paper record, the same 
concern holds true for I-voting: the voter should not be able to have a 
demonstrable record of how that voter voted to prove to another 
person. 
 Also in regards to accuracy, there is the risk of double voting.220 
The issue being that an individual could cast a ballot online and then 
go to a polling location to vote in-person. Again, the concern is not 
insurmountable.221 With the proper system, if a voter had previously 
cast his or her ballot via the internet, then through the use of time 
stamps and vote indexing (a method of assigning numbers to ballots 
cast beyond the scope of this note),222 the voting authority would be 
able to maintain a check as to who had cast their ballot.223 
Theoretically, the same check could prohibit a voter from casting a 
ballot online if a vote had already been registered at the local precinct. 
Either way, if the voter had cast his or her ballot before Election Day, 
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the information would then already be noted for poll workers, thus 
protecting against any double votes.  
3. Secrecy and Privacy 
 Apart from concerns regarding security and accuracy, there are 
issues over the lack of privacy that arise with I-voting. Voters have a 
right to cast their ballot in privacy through a secret ballot.224 Doing so 
protects voters from being coerced or bribed into voting for particular 
measures or candidates.225  Thus, with voting machines, this means 
that the system shouldn’t provide a receipt or any other method for an 
individual to determine the contents of a voter’s ballot.226 However, 
as was seen with the Michigan Democratic Primary discussed above, 
there is no guarantee to anonymity with regular mail-in voting or 
absentee voting. It is still possible for someone to discern how an 
individual voted if so desired. This is similar to I-voting as it currently 
stands. If an election worker so desired, he or she could hypothetically 
access the central server to discern how an individual voted. Again, as 
was found with the Michigan Democratic Primary, this slight risk of 
an election worker discerning an individual’s vote generally gives way 
in light of the ease and convenience of I-voting.  
 Still another major concern is verification of identity.227 Currently, 
voters must identify themselves when voting, often by duplicating an 
ink signature provided at the time of original registration.228 As of 
now, it is impossible to collect a wet signature via the internet.229 A 
wet signature is created with an individual physically marks a 
document.230 However, technology is constantly evolving. Science has 
brought us touch screens, stylus pens, and pads that can ID 
fingerprints. Perhaps, with further experimentation, a satisfactory 
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method of identity verification that does not compromise security may 
be possible; however, at present, such technology is not available to 
conduct elections.231  
 Thus, while these concerns are justified, any major hacks or other 
problems are a rarity with I-voting. While this low number of issues 
may be due in part to the small-scale nature of I-voting experiments 
thus far, and perhaps a larger election would attract more problems 
and unwanted attention from potential hackers, it cannot be said for 
certain. Only by investing anew and exploring these opportunities can 
we discover whether there are solutions to any of these looming 
problems and possibly improve upon our current systems.  
 Any solution will require a significant investment of resources to 
be able to adequately assess its potential. As Professor David Dill, 
professor of computer science at Stanford and founder of Verified 
Voting, has noted, “There need to be some breakthroughs…. I 
wouldn’t rule out Internet voting as something that could eventually 
be done safely…”232 However, these breakthroughs are needed. 
Certainly, blindly rushing the implementation of I-voting would be 
foolish, but it would be similarly foolish to completely foreclose a new 
opportunity to give people another way to access the ballot box. While 
I-voting, in the places where it has been tried, has been shown to not 
really increase voter turnout,233 it’s all about opportunity. 
B. The Possibilities 
 The risks surrounding I-voting are undeniable, yet so are its 
potential benefits. I-voting could result in major improvements to the 
electoral process, including increasing turnout, improving 
convenience and access, reducing the cost of elections for state and 
local jurisdictions, and reducing the number of error votes.234  
1. Increase Voter Turnout 
 One potential advantage to I-voting is the possibility to increase 
voter turnout. For those groups that have difficulty getting to the polls 
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on election day, for example millennials who have historically low 
turnout rates, or even for those citizens who live overseas who may 
not have reliable access to an absentee ballot, I-voting could hold the 
answer. 
 Military voters have a documented history of low voter turnout. 
This is due to both low registration and fewer ballots cast. For the 
2006 federal election, military voter registration was a mere 64.86% 
compared to 83.8% of the general population.235 Of those, only 20.4% 
of military voters actually cast a ballot compared to 39.8% of the 
registered general population.236 Other difficulties with absentee 
ballots for overseas voters include the ubiquitous failure to fill in the 
forms correctly and the “mail transit time” problem with overseas 
voters, often resulting in delayed/lost ballots.237  
 I-Voting may help address the barriers to military and overseas 
voters. As a result of the 1990’s FVAP experiment, one finding was 
that given a small-scale and highly-controlled demonstration, the 
risks posed by the new technology could be mitigated so as to properly 
maintain integrity in the process of both I-registration and I-voting.238 
Additionally, the demonstration found that this method could 
significantly promote the enfranchisement of UOCAVA voters, 
especially those serving in the military.239 By opening the voting 
process to online UOCAVA voters, perhaps many more would take 
part. As an example, the quickly-doomed SERVE project had the goal 
to allow nearly 100,000 Americans overseas to vote over the Internet 
using any computer with a couple basic components, like Microsoft 
Windows.240 The point of this note is not to argue that this method 
would have solved all of the difficulties facing I-voting and UOCAVA 
voters, but that such a goal warrants more than a week’s 
consideration. This reflex appears to be based on fear and acts as a 
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complete stonewall to what could otherwise be viewed as a promising 
experiment and educational process. 
 I-Voting could also serve as a vehicle to encouraging millennials to 
vote. According to a recent report from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
individuals aged 18 to 24 had the lowest voter turnout in the 2012 
Presidential Election with a mere 38%, a staggering number when 
compared to the turnout of those aged 65 and over: 69.7%. 241 Thus, 
the time is ripe for exploration into innovating our voting processes, 
and I-voting may provide some help. For example, with the 2004 
Michigan Democratic Primary, a staggering 41% of 25-year-olds were 
likely to cast their ballot using I-voting.242 
 While I-voting may not hold the answer to increased turnout for 
every age group, it may be able to increase turnout within specific 
areas, here, chiefly among UOCAVA voters and millennials. When 
Oregon made its switch to vote-by-mail, it was found that voting-by-
mail encourages participation from well-educated, older voters with 
interests in campaigns, but that habitual non-voters generally stayed 
as just that.243 I-voting may face a similar situation here. There is 
reason to believe that turnout would increase among the UOCAVA 
voters and the younger population, groups for which turnout has 
historically been low.  
2. Convenience and Access 
 One of the greatest advantages of I-voting is its convenience, as it 
could permit a voter to cast a vote from anywhere at any time.244 
Whether or not I-voting actually increases turnout, it could make 
voting easier/less of a hurdle by allowing the voter to cast his or her 
ballot from a home computer instead of requiring the voter to report 
to the assigned local precinct.  
 Additionally, I-voting could enhance access for people with 
disabilities by allowing them to vote from the comforts of their own 
homes.245 For example, those individuals with mobility limitations or 
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those too ill to leave their homes may benefit from remote I-voting as 
they could avoid going to their polling place.246 Though, vote-by-mail 
also provides such an advantage to many. However, vote-by-mail 
requires time to receive and submit a ballot. I-voting could allow 
someone who has been suddenly struck ill to nonetheless cast a 
ballot.247  
 As more and more voters opt to vote absentee, I-Voting could lend 
a hand to those who simply won’t go to the polls or forget to request 
an absentee ballot by the state’s deadline.248 Further, those individuals 
who are travelling outside of the country – or even farther away than 
their polling location – would have the means of casting their ballots 
with ease from any location with an Internet connection.249 
 Also regarding convenience, I-voting could help to eliminate some 
of the problems this country witnessed in the 2000 presidential 
election.250 With I-voting, “[n]o longer would voters have to trudge 
down to a school, church, or community center in order to vote. No 
longer would factors like bad weather, long lines, or confusion over 
the location of polling places impede voter participation.”251 With 
more voters staying home to vote using the internet, lines at polling 
locations would be shorter for those choosing to vote in the traditional 
manner.  
 Finally, the use of I-voting could enhance convenience for busy 
people who otherwise wouldn’t have time to vote, including those who 
work more than one job, have kids to care for, or have to buy groceries 
for their family. I-voting may even benefit the individual who forgot to 
request an absentee ballot and has now passed the deadline to request 
one.252 Voters could now vote from anywhere, at any time, as long as 
they have an internet connection. When it comes to casting a ballot, if 
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it can be done securely, why would we foreclose the possibility of 
making a part of the process just a little bit easier? 
3. Cost Reduction 
 I-voting offers the additional benefits of cost reductions for those 
running elections.253 For example, in Maricopa County in Arizona, a 
move to online registration has registered savings of eighty cents per 
registration with over 325,000 transactions per year.254 If online 
registration could yield such savings, the potential savings for online 
voting are huge. 
 If the United States were to adopt a poll-site I-voting system, 
states would no longer need expensive DRE voting equipment at each 
polling place.255 Costs could be cut as the consequence of more 
streamlined methods of ballot counting and by reducing the need for 
election officials.256 A similar trend has been seen in vote by mail 
jurisdictions.257 Charles Stewart notes that DRE’s are often under-
deployed as a result of costs, and that this tends to lead to longer lines 
and greater inconvenience.258 
 By allowing voters to access their ballot via the internet, citizens 
could vote wherever they had computer access, and there would not be 
such a compelling need for states and counties to expend large 
amounts of money purchasing new equipment.  
4. Reduce Error Rates 
 Widespread implementation of I-voting could also help eliminate 
the errors that inevitably come with paper ballots and especially with 
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absentee voting. These lost votes come in the form of mailed-in ballots 
arriving too late.259 In the Denver post office central processing 
facility, the Colorado Secretary of State’s office worked overtime to 
collect mail and discovered 366 ballots that would have been lost 
otherwise.260 Printing errors can also arise as seen by the events in 
Miami in 2012.261 Without the painstaking recopying by hand of the 
ballots, potentially 27,000 mailed-in absentee ballots would not have 
been counted, and those voters would have been disenfranchised.262 
Finally, in the 2012 election, of all of the UOCAVA ballots transmitted, 
22.2% were reported to have an “unknown status.”263 Why were so few 
ballots tabulated? The EAC found ballots not received or returned to 
election officials, spoiled, replaced, and undeliverable ballots, as well 
as those “unable to be categorized as to their disposition” all may have 
contributed to the problem.264 What these few examples illustrate is 
that, though current technology is a big improvement over “hanging 
chad” punch cards, nonetheless there remain leaks in the voting 
pipeline.265 I-Voting could help to reduce the number of votes lost 
through those leaks.  
 Additionally, I-voting could provide a level of security to help 
reduce the number of ballots that are intercepted by those who would 
commit fraud. “By requiring voters to authenticate their identity 
electronically before they receive a ballot and after they cast their 
ballot, I-voting can provide a higher level of security, ensuring that the 
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proper voter both received and cast the ballot.”266 Though these votes 
may still be susceptible to some form of cyber-attack, this is no 
different than the traditional mail-in absentee process which can 
certainly be intercepted and manipulated in some manner.267 
VI. THE WAY FORWARD 
 While the risks of I-voting are undeniable, so are the 
opportunities. I-voting has the potential to increase turnout, improve 
convenience and access, cut costs, and reduce the number of lost 
votes. I-voting is not ready for widespread implementation given the 
limitations of currently available technology, but the idea should not 
be discarded. Instead, Congress should provide money for I-voting 
experiments by local governments. If the federal government were to 
provide funds through the EAC to administer to localities, I-voting 
experiments could start small and in diverse locations for greater 
sampling. Gradually, based upon the potential successes and failures 
of these efforts, the size and scope of these experiments could be 
increased.  
 In order to aid in experimentation, the country needs another 
piece of sweeping federal legislation akin to HAVA. Though, given the 
contentious political climate permeating political discourse today, 
such sweeping legislation is rather unlikely. However, were it feasible, 
this legislation should provide additional funding to the EAC which it 
could then distribute to states and localities willing to experiment with 
their own versions of I-voting. The grant should provide sufficient 
funding to provide for additional security features to help protect 
against any potential attacks. After an election has occurred, the 
results could be analyzed to see if turnout increased or if there were 
any issues with security. Furthermore, states and localities should be 
encouraged to explore their own efforts into I-voting. Though, a large 
grant of money from the federal government, like with HAVA, could 
go a long way into prodding states and localities in this direction. 
 What is clear, however, is that there will be no experimentation—
and therefore no innovation—without a substantial infusion of public 
resources. As Professor Hoke notes, “it appears overdue for election 
law to embrace the computer science and information security fields 
as a co-equal nurturing ‘parent’—or at least as a value aunt or uncle—
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of election law.”268 This insight is especially timely, given the looming 
obsolescence of the current generation of voting technology. If the 
goal is to stave off another electoral crisis and improve our voting 
technology, a substantial investment of public resources is essential.  
 Though I-voting technology is not yet ready for prime time,269 with 
the necessary further research and experimentation, widespread 
implementation of I-voting could become a reality.270 However, this 
process will be expensive, as demonstrated by experiments conducted 
to date. For instance, the FVAP demonstration, with its 127 eligible 
voters, and its total of eighty-four actual voters, cost about $74,000 
per vote!271 A municipal election in New South Wales, Australia, that 
was conducted via I-voting cost about $3,500,000 (converted to USD) 
for 46,864 people, or about $74 per vote.272 In contrast, the average 
cost per vote of all other forms used in that election was under $8.273 
Clearly, the costs will be large. Thus, the question becomes: Who 
should bear the costs and the responsibility to act?  
 The answer, simply, is Congress. The experience of HAVA 
demonstrates that federal funding is essential if widespread voting 
technology improvements are to occur. Not only would the federal 
government have sufficient resources to fund experimentation with I-
voting, but it also has the ability to oversee and coordinate research 
among state and local jurisdictions. While there has been some 
experimentation with I-voting, these tests have not been conclusive—
neither in showing that widespread, secure implementation of I-
voting is possible, nor in proving that it is impossible.274 More 
experimentation is vital if we are to answer this question. To support 
this experimentation, Congress should provide additional funding to 
the EAC which could then be allocated to interested localities 
following a competitive-bidding process. This would encourage those 
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269 Clowers, supra note 123, at 93. 
270 Id.  
271 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, and Vote, supra note 53, at 139. 
272 Barbara Simons & Douglas W. Jones, Internet Voting in the U.S., 55 COMMUNICATIONS 
OF THE ACM 68 (2012), http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2012/10/155536-internet-voting-
in-the-us/fulltext (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
273 Id. 
274 ALVAREZ & HALL, Point, Click, and Vote, supra note 53, at 147. 
2016] WEAVER 367 
localities to create and launch their own designs and experiments with 
I-voting. Allowing localities to experiment with potential designs or 
models could help keep the cost per vote down. With the experiments 
occurring across the country and through locally-created designs, 
innovation can be expected to emerge.  
 To be successful going forward, any experiments must promote 
transparency and fair competition.275 Fair competition promotes value 
and market security, and transparency permits those who are affected 
to seek information and redress from vendors and officials.276 Any 
proposed experiments should encourage design flexibility and 
responsibility for any localities and those with whom they contract. By 
allowing flexibility and encouraging competition, those involved will 
be “more likely to negotiate a balance between the interests protected 
as trade secrets and voters’ demands for accountability.”277  
 With a competitive bidding process, election officials can be 
assured of a reduced price tag for the proper system. If the desire is to 
make I-voting sustainable, the cost per vote will have to be 
comparable or less than the cost of voting by more traditional 
methods. As was seen with FVAP, experimentation will be expensive, 
but the New South Wales experiment cost significantly less, though it 
was more expensive than traditional ballot methods.278 Once tested, 
the implementation of I-voting could yield a reduced cost per vote as 
more and more individuals gained access to the Internet and would no 
longer be required to travel to the polls, and those administering 
elections could be freed from purchasing more expensive equipment 
or upgrades.  
 In addition to trying to keep costs down, future experimentation 
will have to adequately address security issues. Smaller I-voting 
experiments have not attracted as much unwanted attention from 
opponents of I-voting activity as would larger experiments. Even still, 
these small-scale experiments have already revealed serious concerns 
in the security of the I-voting process. For example, as discussed 
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above, three computer scientists were able to steal the election in the 
Washington, D.C. experiment!279 For I-voting to receive serious 
consideration, such holes will have to be adequately patched.  
 Further, concerns regarding privacy would have to be addressed. 
It is certainly important to protect voter anonymity. It is beyond the 
scope of this note to propose and evaluate any potential security 
solutions. It is impossible to make any recommendations on 
implementation until more is known about what possible solutions 
work and what do not. However, without such a solution, if one 
should ever exist, I-voting will never become an accepted form of 
ballot casting. In short, there must be some sort of reasonable 
assurance that privacy protections are reasonably adequate. 
 As for the actual implementation of I-voting, there are two 
possible means: (1) establish remote e-voting while still retaining 
current systems, and (2) switch to an I-voting system. Under the first 
scenario, more states would embrace the processes used by Alaska 
and Arizona as mentioned above. Citizens would be able to receive a 
ballot, make their selections, scan the ballot, and either e-mail or 
submit their ballot via a secure delivery system. Under the second 
option, voters, from the comforts of their own homes, would be able to 
go to their state’s secretary of state’s website, provide their identifying 
information, be shown their ballot, make their selections, and hit 
“submit” after providing a virtual signature. The need for designated 
polling locations would be drastically reduced. Those without 
computers would be able to cast their ballot from anywhere they could 
access their internet.  
 For the foreseeable future, I-voting must be optional. What this 
note advocates is the gradual implementation of aspects of I-voting. 
Let us first begin with allowing all of our citizens, not just those who 
qualify under UOCAVA, to be able to scan and e-mail their ballots. 
Once this method has been shown to be secure, then we can begin to 
implement “small-scale” I-voting. In localities which have received 
EAC funding for the purpose of I-voting experimentation, voters 
would be able to report to their polling locations, and much like 
approaching a DRE machine, would be able to go up to a computer 
and cast their votes which would then be submitted via the internet. 
Only after such an implementation has been verified as secure and 
workable, will remote I-voting be possible.  
 Perhaps these experiments will lead to I-voting’s implementation 
on a larger scale, or perhaps it won’t, and it will be clear that I-voting 
279 See Talbot, supra note 8. 
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won’t work. Either way, without further experimentation, we will 
never know. It is unlikely that voting from home will be a reality in the 
near future. However, step by step, and by ensuring a secure process, 
remote I-voting may be more possible than many would guess.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 I-voting is not ready for widespread implementation in the U.S. 
now, nor is it likely to be for some time to come. Yet its potential for 
improving our election system warrants further experimentation. As 
Professor Hoke has argued “[e]lection law scholars must… point the 
way forward for protecting constitutional voting rights from well-
intended but misunderstood technical innovations.”280 However, it 
would be a mistake to write off I-voting as a possibility. The best way 
forward is for Congress to provide funding to the EAC to distribute for 
I-voting experiments. While there are no guarantees, it is possible that 
voters will someday have the option of casting their ballots from the 
comfort and privacy of their own homes. But this possibility will not 
become reality on its own. To embrace this opportunity, a significant 
expenditure of public resources will be required to overcome lingering 
concerns and gain the public’s trust. 
280 Hoke, supra note 5, at 1034-35. 
 
